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I develop a model in which a child's acquisition of a given form of human capital incentivizes adults
in his household to either learn from him (if children act as teachers then adults' cost of learning the
skill falls) or lean on him (if children's human capital substitutes for that of adults in household production
then adults' benefit of learning the skill falls). I exploit regional variation in two shocks to children's
human capital and examine the effect on adults. The rapid introduction of primary education for black
children in the South during Reconstruction not only increased literacy of children but also of adults
living in the same household ("learning" outweighs "leaning"). Conversely, the 1998 introduction
of English immersion in California public schools appears to have increased the English skills of children
but discouraged adults living with them from acquiring the language ("leaning" outweighs "learning").








Parents are often a child's rst teachers, and economic models have long recognized the role
parents play in passing on human capital to their children (see Becker and Tomes 1979,
Becker and Tomes 1986 as well as the response by Goldberger 1989). In contrast, these
models generally assume that children's human capital has little contemporaneous eect on
parents and other adults in their household; it generally does not enter into the household
production function and is not transferred to adults by peer eects or some other form of
learning.1 The empirical treatment of intergenerational transmission of human capital has
followed the theoretical literature in focusing chiey on the transmission from parents to
children (see, for example, Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, Sacerdote 2002, Plug 2004, Black
et al. 2005, and Oreopoulos et al. 2006).
In this paper, I model the transfer of human capital from children to adults. In contrast
to the classic models of intergenerational human capital transmission, which nd that, all
else equal, an increase in parents' human capital leads to an increase in that of their children,
I show that children's human capital investment can either increase or decrease that of the
adult members of their household. The sign of the eect depends on the household production
function and the learning technology.
Suppose a child exogenously acquires a new skill. On the one hand, an adult can learn
from the child, as the cost to adults of learning the skill will fall if their children can teach
it to them. This \learning eect" suggests positive human capital spillovers from children to
adults. On the other hand, an adult can lean on the child, as the benet to adults of acquiring
the skill will fall if children's human capital can substitute for that of adults in the household
production function. This \leaning eect" suggests negative spillovers. Moreover, the model
I present oers a framework for predicting which types of human capital lend themselves
to \leaning" versus \learning." The higher the cost of alternative methods of acquiring the
1Ehrlich and Lui (1991) assume children's human capital aects parents in their old-age and
thus parents invest in their children's human capital because they will one day depend on their
children's income. But the direction of the investment in this model is still from parents to children.
1skill, the more adults will learn from their children. The more children's human capital can
directly increase adults' consumption, the more adults will lean on their children.
The empirical work focuses on two examples where children received a plausibly exoge-
nous shock to their human capital and estimates its eect on the human capital investment
of the adults living with them. During the Reconstruction era following the U.S. Civil War,
the federal government created the Freedmen's Bureau to administer thousands of schools
for black children in the South. Whereas essentially no black children in the Confederacy
had access to formal schooling before the Civil War, over ten percent of those between the
ages of ten and twelve were enrolled in school during the 1869-1870 school year.2 Using
household-level variation based on children's ages interacted with county-level variation in
the educational levels of black children, I nd that living with a literate child increased
the probability a black adult would be literate himself. Thus, on net, Reconstruction-era
Southern blacks appear to have learned from their literate children.
In 1998, California voters passed Proposition 227, which replaced bilingual education with
English immersion in public schools. When classes ended for the summer in 1998, 29 percent
of English-learners received core academic instruction in their native languages; when classes
resumed that September, only 11 percent did. Using geographic variation in compliance with
Proposition 227 across California, I nd that although children living in highly compliant
areas are more likely to speak English after the reform, the adults living with children in
these areas are less likely to be English procient. Thus, on net, immigrant parents appear
to lean on their English-procient children. In both this and the Reconstruction context, the
results are driven by households with children of school-going age, suggesting that children's
human capital acquisition, and not some omitted variable, is driving the eect on adults.
The results in this paper may interest a variety of researchers and policy-makers. First,
the model I present highlights the possibility of \negative" human capital spillovers, which
has received little attention among economists studying peer eects. Of course, economists
2My calculations from the 1870 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).
2have studied free-riding in the context of public-goods games and team work eort, but, in
the context of human capital, have generally assumed individuals learn from their peers.
Second, as most educational policies target children, determining the extent of human
capital spillovers to older members of the household would allow policy-makers to better
compare the marginal social benets and costs of these policies. In the case of English
acquisition, gains to children may be tempered by the negative spillovers on adults. My
results suggest that if policy-makers wish to assimilate entire immigrant families, separate
programs may need to target adults as teaching only children may in fact slow adults'
progress. In contrast, the literacy patterns of Reconstruction-era Southern blacks suggest,
as in Miguel and Kremer (2004), that program evaluations that consider only the eects on
a policy's prime targets may systematically underestimate its social benets.
Third, the transmission of human capital from children to adults likely plays an especially
important role in developing countries. Unlike many developed countries in which average
educational attainment has plateaued, educational attainment in developing countries is still
rising with each successive cohort, so children often have more total years of schooling than
their parents and thus opportunities to teach them new information and skills. To my knowl-
edge, few if any development economics papers have examined whether interventions that
target children aect the adults with whom they live. Given the scarcity of resources of gov-
ernments and NGOs in developing countries, promoting investments with positive spillovers
to parents and addressing situations with negative spillovers could lead to important welfare
gains.
Fourth, even in cases where parents and children have the same level of formal education,
children often invest more in learning how to use new technologies (e.g., computers).3 Thus,
in settings with rapid technology growth, child-to-adult spillovers may play an especially
3I have found very little academic research on the implications of age-specic technology adop-
tion. However, marketing research suggests that one-half of U.S. children have helped their parents
use the Internet to shop at online stores, plan vacations, get driving directions, or download tax
forms. See Gardner (2007).
3important role.
Finally, the results in this paper might interest researchers and policy-makers in the area
of bilingual education and immigration reform. Although Proposition 227 remains contro-
versial in California, Massachusetts and Arizona have since passed similar initiatives (The
Economist, 2008). Taking the opposite approach, districts in Georgia and Utah have hired
teachers from Mexico to conduct classes in Spanish to their growing population of Hispanic
students (Thompson, 2009). Between 1979 and 2006, the number of students K-12 speaking
a foreign language at home has tripled, and the trend shows no sign of reversing (United
States Department of Education, 2008). Understanding the eects of dierent educational
philosophies on immigrant students and their families is likely to remain essential to op-
timally crafting public policy for many years to come; indeed, both Presidents Bush and
Obama have stressed English prociency requirements in their comprehensive immigration
reform proposals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to illustrate the
interactions between children's and adults' human capital investments. Section 3 provides
background on Reconstruction and the Freedmen's Bureau, as well the data, empirical strat-
egy and results for the literacy analysis. Section 4 is the analogue to Section 3 but focuses
on Proposition 227 and English acquisition of immigrants in California. Section 5 concludes
and oers directions for further research.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
This section provides a simple model of how adults' optimal level of human capital investment
depends on the human capital of their children. As in the standard model of human capital
investment (e.g., Ben Porath 1967; Becker 1964), adults weigh the benet of the investment
(the increase in consumption) against its price (the time, opportunity or psychic cost).
4Children change the standard model in two ways. On the one hand, children can decrease
the cost of human capital investment for their relatives. For example, suppose that in order
to learn English immigrant parents can either study at home with their procient child or
attend an English as a Second Language (ESL) class. Not only can they save money and
time if their child acts as their private tutor, they may also \save face" as they can avoid
making potentially embarrassing mistakes in front of strangers. This decrease in the price of
investment leads parents to invest more in human capital acquisition. I call this phenomenon
the \learning eect."
On the other hand, if children's human capital can substitute for that of adults in house-
hold production, then procient children provide many of the benets adults would enjoy
from acquiring the human capital themselves. For example, a literate or English-procient
child can read contracts, bills or coupons, and confer with landlords, doctors and teachers on
behalf of their family members; children's human capital may even assist adults in nding
better jobs.4 The ability of children's human capital to directly increase adults' consumption
decreases adults' incentive to invest in human capital themselves. I call this phenomenon the
\leaning eect."
2.2 Mechanics
I modify the classic returns-to-education model with the above ideas in mind. Adults max-
imize a separable utility function positive and concave in consumption and negative and
convex in the cost of investment.5 Adults' consumption y is a positive and concave function
of both their own human capital k and their children's human capital c, so y = y(k;c).
Adults' human capital k is a positive and concave function of their investment in human
capital, which I denote by e, as one can think of investment in this context as \eort" or
4Basu et al. (2001) use data from Bangladesh to show that having a literate member of the
household is associated with higher wages for non-literate members.
5The convex, negative relationship between cost of investment and utility follows from the
standard assumption that marginal utility diminishes with any \good;" in this case, the \good"
would be lack of investment costs.
5\education."
The cost of investment  is increasing and convex in e. Importantly, there is a comple-
mentarity between adults' investment e and their children's level of human capital c, so that
ec < 0. As described above, having a procient child can reduce the per-unit psychic or
monetary cost of investment e.
With the above assumptions in mind, I specify adults' utility as:
 (y(k(e);c))   (e;c): (1)
As described above, yk, yc, ke, e, ee are positive and ec is negative. As utility is a positive,
concave function of consumption,  0 > 0 and  00 < 0.
Adults choose e so as to satisfy the following rst-order condition:
 
0ykke = e (2)
Equation (2) yields the standard result that individuals set e so that the utility gain due
to the increase in consumption associated with a marginal increase in e (the left-hand side
of the equation) equals the increase in disutility associated with higher investment costs
(right-hand side).
The main comparative static addressed in the empirical work is the eect of children's
human capital on the human capital of adult household members, or
@k(e)
@c . On the one hand,
e, and thus k(e), will increase with c because of the \learning eect." Having a procient
child serve as a tutor decreases parents' per-unit cost of investment (more formally, recall
that ec < 0). As the right-hand side of the equation falls with an increase in c, individuals
must increase e to satisfy the rst-order condition.
On the other hand, e will decrease with c because of the \leaning eect." An increase in
children's human capital directly increases adults' consumption by yc, thus lowering adults'
marginal utility of consumption  0. Therefore, adults will decrease investment so as to equal-
ize the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal dis-utility of investments costs in
6equation 2. All else equal, if adults can rely on children's human capital to increase household
consumption they will invest less in human capital themselves.
The idea of competing incentives is expressed more formally below:
Proposition. The eect of children's human capital on that of adults in the household,
@k(e)
@c , can be positive or negative. It is a positive function of ( ec). This term represents
the extent to which learning from procient children can lower the per-unit cost of adults'
human capital investment (the \learning eect"). It is a negative function of yc, the direct
contribution of children's human capital to adults' consumption (the \leaning eect").
Proof. See appendix.
While the model does not specify the sign of the eect, it does suggest when the sign is
likely to be positive or negative. The learning eect is especially strong when the alternative
to learning from one's children is especially costly. For example, as I discuss in the next
section, very few black adults in the former Confederacy had access to schooling themselves.
So even if they incurred some psychic cost related to the embarrassment of learning from a
child, there did not exist a viable alternative.
Conversely, the leaning eect is likely to be especially important if the   term of utility
were a function only of simple items such as food or clothing, as their consumption value
should be independent of an individual's human capital. However, the marginal utility of
other consumption items may depend on one's own human capital stock. For example, the
consumption value of movies or newspapers depends on having not only the resources to
purchase the ticket or paper but also prociency in the local language. Individuals might
also derive utility directly from the sense of personal accomplishment gained from learning
a new skill. In such cases, having a procient child is a poor substitute for acquiring human
capital oneself.
72.3 Discussion
The model obviously makes many simplifying assumptions and is meant mostly for illustra-
tive purposes. For example, I make no real distinction between household production and
adults' consumption and implicitly assume that parents' consumption increases even when
the increase in household production is due entirely to their children's eorts. Instead, chil-
dren may refuse to contribute to household production if they want their parents to learn the
skill themselves. Similarly, children's human capital acquisition may change the bargaining
power within the household. These eects would act to dampen any \leaning" incentive.
Moreover, the model assumes children's human capital is determined outside the model.
Instead, children may simply refuse to invest in human capital if they know their parents will
free-ride o of them, thus making children's human capital endogenous to parents' expected
behavior. If children only learn when they believe their parents will learn as well, then the
leaning mechanism is eectively shut o.
Obviously, identifying plausibly exogenous sources of variation is essential for estimating
the key comparative statics in the model and is the focus of the remainder of the paper.
The variation I exploit arises from educational interventions that target children. Children
exposed to the intervention acquire higher levels of human capital and I use this variation
to estimate the eects on adults' human capital investment. Moreover, the children most
aected are often quite young and thus may be less likely to act strategically in deciding
how much eort to invest at school.
3 Did former slaves learn from their literate children?
The empirical analysis begins with an investigation of literacy spillovers within Southern
black households during Reconstruction. I start by providing some historical context, rst
on the incentives for black adults to learn to read and write, and then on the educational
opportunities provided by the Freedmen's Bureau. I then describe the individuals I sample
8from the 1870 Census as well as my empirical strategy and results. I conclude the section
with a series of robustness checks.
3.1 Background
Reconstruction and the Freedmen's Bureau
One of the goals of Reconstruction|which generally refers to the policies implemented in
the South by the federal government after the Civil War|was to address the economic needs
of former slaves. This process actually began before the war ended: any time Union soldiers
captured Southern territory they had to decide how to treat individuals held as slaves,
especially after the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 ocially declared such individuals
free. As captured territory grew, the Department of War ocially established the Bureau
for Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands on March 3, 1865, more than a month before
the Confederate surrender. The Freedmen's Bureau, as it became known, was one of the key
institutions of the Reconstruction era and provided former slaves in the Confederacy with
basic food rations, medical care, job placement, and, most famously, education.
Instead of directly running schools for Southern blacks, the Bureau funded religious and
philanthropic organizations to do so. For example, the American Missionary Association
alone was responsible for the instruction of over 40,000 students by 1866 (Butchart, 1980).
By the time of its rst full school year in 1865-1866, the Bureau supported 964 schools and
90,000 pupils. Those numbers increased to 2,677 and 150,000, respectively, by the 1869-
1870 school year (Jones, 1980, p. 224). However, enrollment fell after 1870 as the federal
government disbanded the Freedmen's Bureau and began to bring Reconstruction to a close.6
6By the terms of the Supplementary Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 (passed to continue and
extend the authority created in the original act of 1865), the Freedmen's Bureau was to be disbanded
during the summer of 1868. A last-minute bill was passed to extend its general authority until
January 1869 and to continue its educational mandate indenitely. However, educational funding
was severely cut and the federal role in the education of Southern blacks eectively ended by
the close of 1870 (Morris, 1981, p. 243). By the early 1870s Northern support for reconstruction
had waned and the 1876 \compromise" that granted Republican Rutherford Hayes the presidency
in exchange for the withdrawal of federal troops from the South ocially ended Reconstruction
9Historical evidence of leaning and learning
Southern black adults during Reconstruction had many incentives to learn to read and write
from their children. Collins and Margo (2006) estimate an eleven percent labor-market return
to literacy for blacks in the South in 1870, using occupational status as a proxy for income.
There may have been an even higher return with respect to wealth and consumption, condi-
tional on occupation, as literacy protected former slaves from signing exploitative contracts.
\[T]he ability to read was also crucial for the freed people as they became involved in labor
contracts and as they tried to acquire property. Former slaves recognized the importance of
being able to read contracts, as one recalled, `so they would know how to keep some of them
white folks from gittin' land 'way from 'em if they did buy it' " (Cornelius, 1991, p. 143).
Moreover, children often acted as teachers to both their parents and other members of
the community. Historian Heather Williams writes of the black schoolchild: \as soon as he
learned a lesson, he became responsible for teaching it to someone else" (Williams, 2006,
p. 139). Freedmen's Bureau ocials noted this phenomenon in each of their semi-annual
reports. By the third report, the Commissioner tries to estimate the extent of these spillover
eects:
Adults have acquired condence that they also can learn; even the aged are peer-
ing into these printed pages with some hope that knowledge is for them. Thou-
sands of children who have become advanced are teaching parents and older
members of the family; so that nearly every freedman's home in the land is
a school-house...[and] whole families have become pupils...We scarcely dare es-
timate the number who are at the present time in some process of elementary
learning. To say that half a million of these poor people are now studying...would
be a very low estimate (Alvord, Third Semi-annual Report, 1867, p. 5).
Conversely, former slaves might have relied on their children not to teach but to perform
tasks that required literacy. Learning to read and write likely exacted a lower pecuniary,
opportunity and psychological cost for children, and adults may have found it more ecient
to have their children specialize in literacy-intensive tasks. A former slave testifying before
(Woodward, 1991, pp. 197-198).
10a Congressional committee in 1871 stated: \I have a son I sent to school when he was small.
I make him read all my letters and do all my writing. I keep him with me all the time"
(Williams, 2006, p. 103).
In short, the rapid education of black children provided adults incentives to both learn
and lean, and the rest of this section empirically assesses which incentive outweighed the
other.
3.2 Data
I use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) sample of the 1870
Census. I focus on black individuals ages 25 through 60, as younger individuals might them-
selves have been school children between 1865 and 1870 and I wish to isolate as much as
possible the learning-through-children eect from any eect of adults themselves attending
formal classes. I further restrict my sample to those born in any state of the slave-holding
South and residing at the time of the Census in the former Confederacy, reecting the fact
that Reconstruction did not apply to the slave-holding border states that remained in the
Union.7 Although not all Southern blacks were slaves at the time of the Civil War, the vast
majority of the individuals I sample would have been, though I return to the issue of free
blacks in the pre-bellum period in robustness checks.8 Finally, I restrict attention to those
counties in which at least 100 black individuals are sampled in the 1870 IPUMS, as some of
the empirical work uses county-level averages of black literacy and this restriction reduces
the noise in this measure.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for both the sample of adults described above as
well as children between the ages of ten and eighteen who otherwise meet the sample re-
7Results are robust to restricting the sample to those actually born in the Confederacy or
including those currently residing in slave-holding non-Confederate states.
8Based on tabulated data from the 1860 Census, which reported both slave and free black
populations by state, I estimate that 96 percent of my sample would have been slaves in the pre-
bellum period. My estimates coincide with those of Cramer (1997), who calculates that 3.74 percent
of blacks in the Confederacy were free in 1860.
11strictions. Note that children's literacy is almost twice that of adults, though is still only
about 19 percent. Most adults have at least one child in their household, but less than half
live with a child of \school-going age" (which I dene as between ten and fourteen, as in
my sample children of those ages have the highest enrollment rates). Over nine percent of
children \attended or were enrolled in school" at some point in the last twelve months. The
corresponding number for adults is 0.2 percent, a fact to which I will return at the end of
this section.9
One of the key explanatory variables used in this section is the county-level literacy rate
among black children. (Note that I will often just use the term \child literacy rate" in the
interest of brevity but, unless otherwise noted, this term refers specically to the county-
level literacy rate of black children. The same convention applies to the use of \adult literacy
rate.") I estimate this measure directly from the IPUMS by calculating for each county the
literate share of all black children between the ages of 10-18 (the 1870 Census only asks the
literacy question of children over nine years of age).
3.3 Empirical strategy
Although the model relates adults' literacy to that of their children, regressing an indicator
for whether an adult is literate on an indicator for whether he lives with a literate child
is likely to produce a positively biased coecient on the latter variable, via any number
of endogeneity scenarios. For example, an intrinsic aptitude or desire for learning to read
may \run in the family." Similarly, adults can teach children, which is after all the more
traditional route of human capital transmission.
Instead, I proxy the probability of living with a literate child with the interaction between
the literacy rate of black children in the respondent's county and an indicator variable for
whether the respondent is living with a child, which suggests the following dierences-in-
9The 1870 Census has no other education measure, such as highest grade completed or total
years of schooling.
12dierences estimation:
Literateic = Child-in-housei  Black-child-lit-ratec + ic + Xi + "ic; (3)
where i indexes individuals and c indexes counties; Literateic is an indicator variable for
whether person i in county c reports being able to read; Black-child-lit-ratec is the estimated
literacy rate among black children in county c; Child-in-housei is coded as one if a child lives
in individual i's household; ic is a vector of the two main eects of the interaction term;
Xi is a vector of individual covariates; and "ic is the error term.10 Loosely speaking, living
in a county with high levels of child literacy is the treatment, and adults living with and
without children are, respectively, the treatment and control groups. In other regressions,
adults living with school-age children and all other adults living with children serve as the
respective treatment and control groups.
Note that I do not have any variation across time as no literacy information exists for black
slaves or their children in the 1860 Census. Although teaching slaves to read was explicitly
outlawed in all confederate states except Tennessee (Frasier, 2002, p. 99), anecdotal evidence
suggests that some slaves managed to acquire literacy in the pre-bellum South and literacy
rates among free Southern blacks in the 1860 IPUMS appear to be about thirty percent
(though recall this group accounted for only four percent of all Southern blacks).11
Though I cannot rely on variation across time, the cross-sectional variation I use arises
from pre-determined characteristics at the county level interacted with pre-determined char-
acteristics at the household level. In fact, there is likely some random component to geo-
graphic variation in black children's literacy. Bureau ocials and aid societies often estab-
lished schools in areas where union soldiers were located at the time of the Confederate
10I use a linear probability model instead of a probit model because I eventually estimate a
county-xed-eects model and want to guard against the incidental parameters problem (even
when I eliminate counties with few observations in the IPUMS, I am left with over two hundred
counties). However, in practice, using a probit model and including the xed eects does not change
any of the results.
11Collins and Margo (2006) estimate that up to ten percent of slaves may have been literate in
the late ante-bellum period. Also see Cornelius (1991).
13surrender, an allocation that appears plausibly exogenous with respect to literacy patterns
(Berlin et al., 1998, pp. 40, 154, 161). Moreover, that variation is interacted with an additional
source of variation (age structure of the individual's household). Ideally, these interactions
would not only be positively correlated with having a literate child, but also unrelated to
adult literacy outside of my proposed mechanism, and potential endogeneity scenarios are
discussed in detail later in the section.
3.4 Results
Raw trends
Before turning to the regression analysis, I examine the relationship between adult and
child literacy rates graphically. On the x-axis of Figure 1, I plot the literacy rate of black
children for each county. Figure 1 suggests that this measure has considerable variation across
counties, though many appear clustered at zero.
Against this county-level child literacy rate I plot county-level literacy rates for three
groups of black adults: those without children in their household, those with children in their
household but none of whom are of school-going age (ages ten to fourteen), and those with
school-age children in their household. All three series show a strong, positive correlation with
the county-level literacy rates of black children, which is not surprising given the omitted-
variables scenarios discussed in the previous subsection. The rst series highlights this point:
even though these adults do not live with children and thus are very unlikely to be subject
to my proposed mechanism, their literacy rates are still strongly correlated with those of the
children in their county.
Evidence in support of learning-from-children hypothesis cannot be found by looking at
the overall correlation of county-level adult and child literacy rates, but by comparing that
correlation for dierent sets of adults. The hypothesis predicts that the correlation should
be strongest for adults who have signicant contact with children and especially those who
have contact with children of school-going age. Indeed, Figure 1 shows that compared to
14adults who do not live with children, the literacy rates of adults who live with children
appear more closely linked to the county-level child literacy rate. Moreover, the strongest
correlation exists between child literacy rates and the literacy rates of adults who live with
children of school-going age.
Regression results
Table 2 shows the results from estimating equation (3). As additional controls, I include
dummy variables for age, gender and urban-versus-rural in all regressions. The estimated
coecient on the child-literacy-rate variable suggests that living in a county where all black
children are literate increases the probability that a black adult is literate by 45.8 percentage
points, relative to his counterpart in a county where no children are literate. Equivalently,
moving from a county with a ve percent child literacy rate (the 25th percentile for this
variable) to one with a twenty-ve percent rate (the 75th percentile) is associated with a 9.2
percentage point (0.458*(0.25-0.05) = 0.092) increase.
Importantly, the interaction between the indicator for having a child in the household and
the child literacy rate is positive and signicant. The point estimate suggests that for an adult
living with a child, moving from the 25th-percentile to the 75th-percentile county increases
the likelihood he is literate by an additional 3.7 percentage points (0.187*0.20=0.0374), or
36.3 percent, given a baseline probability of 0.103. Col. (2) adds county-level xed eects,
which reduces the coecient on Child-in-house  Black-child-lit-rate, though it remains
positive and statistically signicant.
The results in the rst two columns are consistent with adults learning from children.
If learning is actually driving the results, then the eect should be driven by children of
school-going age, as, say, a two-year-old child is unlikely to serve as a teacher to her parents.
Col. (3) is the analogue to col. (1) except that adults living with school-age children (ages 10
to 14) serve as the treatment group and all other adults living with children as the control
group. The coecient on the interaction term suggests that an adult living with a school-age
15child in a county where all children are literate is roughly 14 percentage points more likely
to be literate than is his neighbor who lives with children not of school-going age. In col.
(4), adding county xed eects slightly reduces the coecient on the interaction term, but
it remains positive and signicant.
I take the regression represented in col. (4) as my preferred specication. Whether some-
one lives with a child may obviously be correlated with many observable and unobservable
traits that could be correlated with literacy, but the variation in the exact ages of the children
in a household has at least some plausibly exogenous component. Moreover, I interact this
information with the county-level child literacy rate, which has an independent, geographic
dimension of variation. The validity of the results from my preferred specication depends
on whether this interaction term is orthogonal to other factors that could determine adult's
literacy, which I explore in the subsection below.
3.5 Alternative hypotheses
Dierential reactions to county characteristics
Obviously, there are important dierences, both observable and unobservable, between coun-
ties with high and low black child literacy rates. For example, the return to education might
be higher in the former, and thus parents and other adults living with children might decide
to invest more in education on their own, without any inuence or assistance from their
children. Similarly, counties with educational opportunities for black children might attract
relatively educated or education-minded black parents. Of course, the specications in Table
2 start to address that possibility, by comparing adults with and without children and with
and without children of school-going age, but it could still be the cases that adults with
children are simply more responsive to human capital returns and educational opportunities
than other adults.
One check on the likelihood of these scenarios is to explore whether literacy of white
adults who otherwise meet the selection criteria exhibit the same patterns with respect to
16black child literacy rates. Of course, whites are a highly imperfect comparison group, as even
in the same county they inhabited dierent economic and social environments. For example,
the overall white literacy rates in my sample are 80 percent for adults and 65 percent for
children, compared with 11 and 19 percent, respectively, for blacks. However, Reconstruction,
which was at its height at the time of the Census, created a temporary moment when the
economic and social opportunities for Southern blacks and whites were more similar than
they had ever been before and would be for decades, and thus some of the same county-level
factors that might have motivated blacks to invest in education or attracted educated blacks
would have had the same eect on whites. As such, examining white literacy patterns can
at a minimum serve as basic falsication tests.
The regression reported in col. (5) of Table 2 is identical to col. (4) except that white
adults with children in their household serve as the sample group. The coecient on School-
age-child-in-house  Black-child-lit-rate is insignicant and in fact negative (though very
close to zero). Thus, the literacy dierences between white adults with school-age children
and other whites with children have no apparent relationship to the black child literacy rate,
in stark contrast to black adults.
Finally, I explore the relationship between black adult literacy rates and white child
literacy rates. The specication in col. (6) is identical to that in col. (4) except for an added
White-child-literacy-rate  School-age-child-in-house interaction term. The coecient on
this term is insignicant, close to zero and in fact negative, and, moreover, the coecient
on the School-age-child-in-house  Black-child-lit-rate is unchanged from that in col. (4).
Thus, black adults' literacy rates respond to factors highly correlated to black child literacy
rates, not child literacy rates more generally.
17Adults taught children
Another alternative explanation is that adults were teaching children, instead of children
teaching adults.12 Some Southern blacks had indeed attained literacy by the end of the Civil
War, obviously independently of any eect the Freedmen's Bureau would later have on their
children. I thus try to eliminate from the regression sample adults who were potentially
literate by the end of the war, in order to shut o this potential source of reserve causality.
Many Southern black men learned to read while ghting in the Union Army (Berlin et al.,
1998). Therefore, col. (2) of Table 3 includes all women, but only men too old or young to
have served. The point-estimate is essentially identical to that in Table 2 (which I reprint in
col. (1) for ease of comparison).
Similarly, another group of Southern blacks who gained some literacy before the end
of the War were freemen (and women). While it was illegal to teach a slave how to read
in all states but Tennessee, no such restrictions existed for free Southern blacks. Assuming
free blacks were indeed more likely to have been literate by the end of the Civil War (see
subsection 3.3 for a discussion of literacy rates of free blacks), in col. (3) I exclude the three
states with the highest free share of blacks as of the 1860 census (Louisiana, North Carolina,
and Virginia). Again, the point-estimate appears largely invariant to this sampling choice,
and actually increases several percentage points.
Adults attended school themselves
While the analysis has generally assumed that adults learned at home from children who
passed on what they had learned in school, many adults attended classes themselves during
Reconstruction. Indeed, a common image from the period is that of adults and students
sitting side-by-side in classrooms. If adults with school-age children are more likely to attend
12Comparing the children of former slaves with the children of free northern blacks, Sacerdote
(2005) nds signicant intergenerational correlation with respect to literacy, though does not claim
a causal interpretation. He shows evidence that by the second generation born after the Civil
War the outcomes of the grandchildren of former slaves have almost fully converged with those of
pre-bellum black freemen.
18school themselves, then this direct-education mechanism could be driving the results reported
so far. While one could view this mechanism as a positive spillover from children to adults,
if it entirely drove the eect then the results found in this context may not be generalizable
to situations where adults did not themselves have access to schooling.
Col. (4) shows the results from estimating the preferred specication but substituting
school attendance as the dependent variable. The coecient on the variable of interest is
essentially zero. The results cast some doubt on the common image of mixed-generation
schoolhouses. Indeed, Freedmen's Bureau reports emphasize that, if anything, adults at-
tended Sunday schools and night schools (which the Census did not record in their denition
of being \in school"), which tended to focus on religious education and home economics.13
One might worry that adults that attended part-time with their children might not report
doing so to Census takers. The group most frequently cited as attending alongside children
were not parents, but grandparents.14 In the nal column, I examine whether these older
individuals could be driving the results by sampling only adults between 20 and 40 years
old, and the coecient on the interaction term in fact increases slightly.
3.6 Discussion
This section has presented a variety of evidence suggesting that during Reconstruction black
children passed on literacy skills to their parents. First, living in a county where black children
have relatively high literacy rates correlates with higher rates for black adults, even higher
13The report led for Mississippi in 1866 praises the idea of Sunday schools but concedes that
most of the instruction is oral and religious, and that the schools are generally \after the pattern
of those existing in the time of slavery" (Alvord, Second Semi-Annual Report, 1866, p. 8). The
following year, the Freedman's Bureau commissioner recommends a more practical and less aca-
demic education for adults. \We propose, therefore, a wider, more general educational eort: the
instruction of freedmen in civil aairs; the improvement of home life and the family condition;
the encouragement of intelligent thrift, industry and the accumulation of property" (Alvord, Third
Semi-Annual Report, 1867, p. 37).
14For example: \Tottering old men and women sat side by side with their children and grand-
children endeavoring to learn their letters. Adult freedmen used every spare minute to learn. It was
not uncommon to see them studying the alphabet during rest periods and after work" (Meyers,
1971, p. 163).
19rates for black adults who have a child in their house, and even higher rates for black adults
living with a school-age child. The eect does not seem to be driven by adults teaching
children. Very few adults would have been literate at the end of the Civil War and when I
eliminate the groups most likely to be literate the result does not change.
The section also explored whether having a child, and especially a school-age child, in-
creased the likelihood that an adult would attend school himself. The census in 1870 does not
inquire about night school, but there is no evidence that adults living with children in high
literacy counties are more likely to attend day school. Furthermore, the results hold even
after eliminating older individuals, the group historians most often mention as attending
school alongside children.
Of course, the result that children's literacy rates tend to increase those of adults de-
pends on factors such as the specic household production technology and the nature of the
educational intervention. I next investigate the relationship between adults and children's
human capital in a very dierent context.
4 Do immigrant adults \lean" on their English-speaking children?
In this section, I explore English-language spillovers from children to adults in immigrant
families. I rst review some past work on language acquisition as well as provide background
on the policy experiment used to identify the eect of children's learning English on older
household members. I then present the data, empirical strategy and results.
4.1 Background and past work
In U.S. immigrant households, children are often the rst to become English procient. This
tendency is likely due to their exposure to public schooling as well as the greater ability
of the young to learn new languages, especially during the so-called \critical period" (after
infancy but before puberty) when for neural or behavioral reasons humans seem much more
20adept at language acquisition.15
Immigrant adults have many incentives to learn English, from their children or otherwise.
There is a large literature linking immigrants' wages to their English skills, with almost all
papers nding a strong, positive relationship.16 For example, instrumenting for an immi-
grant's English prociency with whether he arrived in the U.S. during his \critical period,"
Bleakley and Chin (2004) nd that speaking English \well" as opposed to \poorly" (ac-
cording to Census classications) earns a 33 percent wage premium. Moreover, not only do
English skills bring labor-market returns, they might also enhance consumption: adults can
more carefully choose which items to purchase at a store or a restaurant and can more fully
enjoy American movies or music or other forms of entertainment.17
However, there is also much sociological and ethnographic work on how immigrant chil-
dren can minimize adults' need to learn English. Scholars have created the term \language
brokering" for the practice of children in immigrant families negotiating the English-speaking
world for their older relatives. Orellana et al. (2003) provides a description from a daughter
of Mexican immigrants:
As a kid I translated phone calls, TV shows, bills, letters from the welfare de-
partment, visits to the doctor, visits with social workers, interviews; and I lled
15See Newport (2002) for a review of research on the \critical" or \sensitive" period hypoth-
esis rst developed by Lennenberg (1967). Functional magnetic resonance imaging evidence even
suggests that adults and children use dierent parts of the brain when acquiring a new language.
16While a chief concern is omitted-variables bias (e.g., a standard \ability bias" scenario would
likely lead to a positively biased coecient on English skills), Chiswick and Miller (1995), Angrist
and Lavy (1997) and Dustmann and van Soest (2002) all attempt to address this endogeneity
problem. Bleakley and Chin (2004) review these and other papers.
17Note that some of these benets may be muted in California, the setting I study. A quarter of
the state's population was born outside the U.S., its cities contain large ethnic neighborhoods and
employers depend on immigrant labor (documented or otherwise). Thus, perhaps more than in any
other state, California's immigrants might well be able to nd employment, enjoy leisure activities
such as movies, music and television, and read newspapers and books without ever learning English.
Lazear (1999) shows that the probability an immigrant speaks English is inversely related to the
share of the local population that speaks his native language. Moreover, Hall and Farkas (2008) nd
that return to human capital to be lower for Hispanics|the majority of California's immigrants|
than other immigrants, and speculate that lack of legal residency or citizenship may prohibit them
from getting certain higher-paying jobs (for which English prociency would presumably be more
necessary).
21out applications for health care, welfare and social security benets. I did this
because I was the only one who could do it. I was the only one in my family who
could communicate in both English and Spanish. I became the key to accessing
the resources my family needed.
To the best of my knowledge there has been no attempt to systematically gauge how
widespread this practice is across the US, but sociologists have conducted small surveys
in a variety of localities that include questions on language brokering. In a survey of 64
students from a \major metropolitan high school" born primarily in China and Vietnam,
Tse (1996) nds that 59 students report translating for their parents (and four of the ve who
report not doing so indicate they have older siblings who do). Orellana et al. (2003) report
that \almost all" of the 236 Spanish-speaking students they survey in a Chicago elementary
school act as language brokers, and specically report that 73 percent have brokered for their
mothers.18 They suggest that this share is remarkably high given that a signicant share of
the children's parents had been living in the US for much of their lives. Finally, some evidence
suggests children are highly eective translators: in a small study of sixteen Puerto Rican
elementary-school students from an \extremely low socioeconomic" neighborhood in New
Haven, Malako and Hakuta (1991) nd that children make very few errors when translating,
though display slightly higher accuracy when translating from Spanish to English than vice
versa.
Thus, there appears to be strong incentives for immigrant adults in both the \leaning"
and \learning" directions. As I will discuss in greater detail, an OLS estimate of adults'
English skills on those of their children is likely to be positively biased via any number of
endogeneity scenarios and thus unhelpful in determining which incentive dominates. Being
unable to randomly assign adults to households with or without English-speaking children, I
turn instead to quasi-experimental variation generated by an abrupt policy shift in California.
18The data are not presented in a disaggregated manner so I cannot calculate what share have
language brokered for family members in general.
224.2 Proposition 227
In 1998, Californians passed Proposition 227, which declared that \all public school instruc-
tion be conducted in English." Though some exceptions were allowed and a year of \bridge"
programs was oered to some students, the overall eect of the policy was a sudden shift
from traditional \bilingual" education (in which students are taught subjects such as math
and science in their native language and further development of the native language is of-
ten an explicit goal) to English immersion. During the 1997-1998 school year, 29 percent of
limited-English prociency (LEP) students were being taught at least two academic subjects
in their native language. By the fall of 1998, only eleven percent were.
Proposition 227 contains strong language with few grounds for exceptions, but some
schools found ways to limit and at times avoid the implementation of the policy. The law
allowed parents to petition for waivers to keep their children in bilingual programs, and if
more than twenty students speaking a given foreign language in a school presented waivers,
that school could provide bilingual education in that language. However, these waivers had
to be certied by the local schools, so students who attended a school whose administrators
were in favor of Proposition 227 were less likely to have their waivers certied than those
who attended an anti-Proposition-227 school.
Past research has explored heterogeneity in compliance with Proposition 227. Garcia and
Curry-Rodriguez (2000) nd that schools that had a large share of limited-English-procient
students in bilingual education programs in the pre-227 period were more likely to certify
waivers and thus retain bilingual education programs. Compliance also seems to depend on
institution size: Bali (2003) nds that larger districts were more likely to notify parents of
their right to petition for a waiver.
Evaluations of Proposition 227, like most research related to the bilingual-versus-English-
immersion debate, have focused on how the policy has aected students' academic achieve-
ment, as opposed to whether it improved their English prociency. Overall, the evidence has
been inconclusive. Using compliance with Proposition 227 as a source of quasi-experimental
23variation, Hoxby and Gordon (2004) nd that bilingual education improves test scores in
several subjects among students in early grades. Most papers, however, do not directly ad-
dress potential endogeneity issues. Amselle and Allison (2000) highlight large post-227 gains
on the state's Stanford 9 achievement exam for LEP students, while Butler et al. (2000)
point out that non-LEP students enjoyed the same gains. The state's own evaluation of
Proposition 227 found insignicant eects of bilingual education on math and reading scores
(Parrish et al., 2006), though the authors acknowledge that their hierarchical model may not
control for non-random selection into bilingual versus English-immersion classrooms. The
lack of consensus regarding Proposition 227's eect on academic achievement mirrors that of
the bilingual-versus-English-immersion debate more generally. Both Matsudaira (2005) and
Jepsen (2010) provide excellent reviews.
Perhaps because there is a strong a priori assumption that English immersion would
be superior to bilingual education with respect to the specic goal of improving English
prociency, research has not focused on this outcome.19 An important exception is Jepsen
(2010). Using data from the California English Language Development Test (CELDT) in 2003
and 2004, he nds that, relative to English immersion, bilingual education lowers students'
English prociency. His results are consistent across OLS, propensity-score matching, and
IV estimates (using electoral support for 227 as an instrument). The eect is especially large
among English learners with relatively low baseline English skills. As I focus on newly arrived
immigrant students, his results suggest that the gains to English prociency associated with
English immersion should be especially pronounced among the students in my sample.20
19It is dicult to extrapolate from the academic achievement literature to English prociency.
While English prociency no doubt helps students perform well on a general achievement test, the
skill sets are distinct in many ways. Butler et al. (2000) argue that in particular the state's Stanford
9 exam is unable to measure English prociency.
20He cannot look before and after Proposition 227 as the CELDT was only established in 2001.
While not as germane to the current study, other economists have also used quasi-experimental
variation in studies on language instruction outside of the Proposition-277 context. Matsudaira
(2005) uses a regression-discontinuity design and nds that assignment into an English-immersion
classroom does not improve math or reading test scores. Unfortunately, he cannot measure changes
in English prociency per se as those assigned to English-immersion classes never retake the English
prociency exam. Angrist et al. (2006) nd that exposure to English instruction in Puerto Rican
244.3 Data
Individual-level census data
I use IPUMS census data from 1990 and 2000 to examine the English skills of immigrant
household members before and after the passage of Proposition 227. Every person ve years
and older is asked whether he can speak English, and, if so, if he speaks well or very well. A
more objective measure of English skills would be preferable, but this self-report is the best
measure available in the data, and Kominski (1989) nds it to be reliable, at least in earlier
censuses.
I make several sampling restrictions. First, I only include immigrants from non-English
speaking countries. Second, to ensure that children in the treatment period would have spent
most of their years in the US under the English-emersion regime, I include only those who
arrived in the U.S. within three years of being observed in the census.21 As in the previous
section, I choose a group of adults ages 25-60 so that none of them would have received K-12
education themselves in California. For similar reasons, I also exclude adults who report
attending school themselves at the time of the Census.
Summary statistics appear in Table 4, separately for children (5-18 years old) and adults
(25-60 years old). Recently arrived immigrant children are more likely to speak English
than adults, consistent with the research cited earlier. The Hispanic share is higher for
children, suggesting perhaps that Hispanic families are more likely to immigrate with children
compared to other large immigrant groups in California. Both samples are roughly equally
divided by gender.
public schools did not have lasting eects on English prociency thirty to forty years later. Of
course, their example diers from the Proposition 227 setting in that in Puerto Rico English was
not the ocial language.
21The Census also places each immigrant in categories indicating the year they immigrated
(e.g., \1987-1990"), so I chose the most recent category consistent across both census years, which
happens to be \arrived within three years."
25School-level Proposition 227 compliance data
I complement the IPUMS data with annual school-level data from the California Department
of Education Language Census data les.22 These data provide the total number of \English
learners" as well as the educational programs in which they are enrolled.
The variable I generally use from these data is the number of students in what the
CDE terms \English Language Development and Academic Subjects Through the Primary
Language (L1)."23 Students in this program receive at least two core academic subjects in
their native language. For each school, I calculate the percentage-point change between 2000
and 1998 in the share of English learners enrolled in this program. As mentioned earlier,
this share falls from 29 percent during the 1997-1998 school year to 11 percent during the
1998-1999 school year, where it remains during the 1999-2000 school year. For convenience,
I generally refer to this percentage-point change as the \compliance" rate. However, it really
is simply the change in the probability that an English learner will experience traditional,
primary-language bilingual education. Thus, for schools that had no primary-language in-
struction before and after 1998, the \compliance" measure will be zero even though they
were perfectly compliant both before and after Proposition 227 was passed.24
I weight this compliance measure by the total English-learner attendance in that school
and take the weighted average for each Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) in the Census
data. While I would ideally like to match each student in the Census data with the school
he attends, such geographic precision is not available in the IPUMS and the PUMA is the
most disaggregated level at which I can match students to compliance rates.25
Fortunately, as I document graphically in a later subsection, there is great variation in
compliance across PUMAs. The typical student lives in a PUMA that saw the share of English
22These data can be accessed via the California Department of Education at the following url:
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/sd/fslc01p234.asp.
23This variable is called ELDL1 in the CDE dataset from the previously-noted url.
24This measure of compliance is also used in Hoxby and Gordon (2004).
25I actually use the CPUMA variable|\consistent PUMA"|in the IPUMS, which are areas
that are dened consistently between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.
26learners in \L1" instruction fall by 13 percentage points, whereas the most \compliant"
PUMA saw its share fall by 26 percentage points and the least compliant slightly increased
its share.
4.4 Empirical strategy
Simply regressing parents' English skills on those of their children would almost surely yield
a positively biased coecient on the latter variable. As in the previous section, any number of
omitted-variables or reverse-causality scenarios exist. An inherent facility for learning foreign
languages may \run in the family;" an adult expressing embarrassment due to their inability
to speak English may render his children timid in their eorts to learn and practice the
language; and, of course, parents uent in English can teach their children, as in Bleakley
and Chin (2008).
As such, instead of directly regressing parents' English skills on those of their children, I
exploit variation generated by the uneven compliance with Proposition 227. The treatment
eect I seek to estimate is having an English-procient child in one's household. Assuming
Proposition 227 compliance increases children's English prociency (a claim I support in
the next subsection), the treatment eect can be estimated by the following dierences-in-
dierences-in-dierences equation:
Speakipt = Child-in-housei  Compliancep  Aftert + p + ipt + Xi + "ipt; (4)
where i denotes the individual, p the PUMA, and t the year (either 1990 or 2000); Child-in-house
is a dummy for whether the adult lives in a household with a child; Compliancep is the
percentage-point decrease in bilingual-education enrollment at the average school in PUMA
p; Aftert is an indicator for whether the subject is observed after passage of the proposition
(i.e., in the 2000, as opposed to 1990, census); p is a vector of PUMA dummies (which
controls for PUMA-level dierences in Compliance); ipt is a vector of all the lower-order
terms of Child-in-housei  Compliancep  Aftert; Xi is a vector of covariates; and "ipt is
27the error term.
If adults lean on (learn from) their children, then  should be less (greater) than zero. The
treatment eect represents the dierential eect living in a Proposition-227-compliant PUMA
has on adults who live with children relative to those who do not. Using variation across time
should control for unobserved heterogeneity at the PUMA level; using the control group of
adults without children should control for unobserved heterogeneity at the PUMA-year level,
such as migration patterns or changes in industry composition, which might correlate with
adults' English acquisition. The identifying assumption is that this unobserved heterogeneity
has the same eect on adults with and without children.
While equation (4) illustrates the spirit of the estimation, similar to the previous section,
my preferred specication actually compares adults living with children between the ages of
seven and fteen with all other adults living with children. Children in this age range are
old enough to begin to take some responsibility for language brokering; they are also young
enough to be required to attend school and to have arrived in the US not long beyond their
own \critical period" for learning English.26
4.5 Results
Basic trends
Before turning to regression results, I graph the basic relationships between a PUMA's level
of English prociency and its compliance with Proposition 227. Specically, for each PUMA,
I plot the percentage-point change between 1990 and 2000 in the share of immigrant children
who speak English against the percentage-point change in the probability they were taught
in their primary language, that is, the \compliance rate." If, as in Jepsen (2010), English
immersion is associated with greater English prociency, then the change in the share of
immigrant children who speak English should be most positive in the areas most compliant
with Proposition 227. Figure 2 shows that the change in the share of children who speak
26As I document later in the section, changing the age range slightly does not aect the results.
28English is indeed a positive function of compliance.
Figure 2 also displays this relationship for adults, both those living with and without
children between the ages of seven and fteen. There is little relationship between PUMA
compliance and changes in the probability that adults living without such children speak
English. However, there is a negative relationship for adults living with children in this age
range. In PUMAs that saw little change in the probability children would receive primary-
language instruction, the probability that this group of adults would speak English barely
changed; in PUMAs where children were much more likely to be instructed in English, this
group of adults became less likely to speak English in 2000 than in 1990.
To summarize, between 1990 and 2000, children's English prociency improved in areas
that saw the largest shift away from bilingual education. However, this shift appears to have
the opposite eect on the adults these school children live with, and has very little if any
eect on other adults. Thus, Figure 2 provides graphical evidence consistent with adults
\leaning" on their children's improved English skills.
Regression results
Here, I estimate the regression analogues of Figure 2. I rst focus on the eect of compliance
with Proposition 227 on the English prociency of children by estimating the following
dierences-in-dierence equation on the sample of children described in Table 4:
Speakipt = Compliancep  Aftert + p + Aftert + Xi + "ipt; (5)
where all notation follows from equation (4).
The rst three columns of Table 5 show the results from estimating variants of equation
(5). All regressions in these and other columns include dummy variables for age in years,
gender, race, Hispanic origin, and the region of the country of origin.27
27The regions are: Central American and the Caribbean, South America, Western Europe, Cen-
tral, Eastern and Southern Europe, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
29The results are not surprising given Figure 2. The rst column suggests that a child
in a highly compliant PUMA after the passage of the proposition is more likely to speak
English: the point-estimate suggests that going from the most compliant PUMA (which has
a compliance value of 0.26) to the least (which has a value of -0.03) would increase the
probability an immigrant student speaks English by 0:1180:29 = 3:4 percentage points, or
4.2 percent given a baseline probability of 0.815. The results also indicate that on average
boys and Hispanics in the sample are less likely to speak English.
The second column shows that this result holds when instead of a dummy variable for
whether the child reports speaking English, a categorical variable from zero to three indicat-
ing prociency level is used.28 My preferred specication is to use the dichotomous variable,
but the results appear robust to either dependent variable.
One potential worry is that compositional changes across counties might be in part driving
the result. In col. (3), I interact the Hispanic dummy variable as well as (logged) house-
hold income and age|three variables highly predictive of English prociency|with the
Compliance, After, and ComplianceAfter variables and include them, as well as the main
eect of logged income, in the regression in col. (1).29 The coecient on ComplianceAfter
remains positive and signicant and actually grows slightly in magnitude. Overall, exposure
to English immersion appears to increase the probability that a student reports being able
to speak English.30
In cols. (4) and (5) I turn to whether compliance aected adults as well, and in par-
ticular the dierential eect on adults living with children relative to adults living without
children. The coecient on the triple interaction term ComplianceChild-in-houseAfter
28The four categories are: does not speak English (0), speaks English but not well (1), speaks
English well (2), speaks English very well (3).
29Hispanic and Age main eects were already included in the baseline specication.
30Note that, as discussed earlier in this section, the debate over bilingual education is much
broader than which type of instruction best promotes English language prociency. The debate
includes whether the language gains represented by English emersion outweigh the potential losses
associated with students being taught math and science in English before they understand the
language. Evidence relevant to this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
30is negative but not signicant. To conserve space, I do not include the continuous prociency
specication in the table, but the coecient in that specication is also negative but not
signicant.
In cols. (6) through (8) I explore dierences between adults living with children of the
age where they could be useful language brokers and all other adults living with children. As
discussed earlier, I assume that children between the ages of seven and fteen would be most
useful in this regard. In these specications, the coecient of interest is always negative and
signicant. The result holds when prociency serves as the dependent variable in col. (7) or
when interactions with Hispanic, Income and Age are included in col. (8).
The point estimates in cols. (1) - (3) and (6) - (8) suggest that the indirect eect of
Proposition 227 on adults was in fact comparable to and perhaps even larger than the
direct eects on children. Of course, the binary \speaks English" variable is a very imperfect
measure of language skills, and when a more continuous measure is used, the eects are
more similar in size. Moreover, the sizable standard errors for each estimate along with the
possibility that adults and children answer the question dierently suggests that comparing
estimates across dierent samples should be done with caution. Nevertheless, the coecient
estimates suggest that the spillover eect on adults may indeed be economically signicant.
4.6 Robustness checks and heterogeneity
Table 6 subjects the main \lean-on" result in col. (6) of Table 5 to several robustness checks.
While I have so far relied on linear probability models in order to be parallel to the previous
section, in col. (2) I report probit results (as marginal eects), and the coecient of interest
is if anything slightly larger in magnitude than in the original result, reproduced in col. (1).
Col. (3) shows that the result is not sensitive to dening children ages seven to fteen as
the ideal language brokers. The coecient of interest when the ages six and sixteen are used
is very similar to the original result. Though I do not report these results, the coecient is
essentially unchanged when living with children ages six to fteen or seven to sixteen serves
31as the treatment group.
The rest of the table explores heterogeneity across dierent groups. Cols. (4) and (5) show
that the leaning eect is largely driven by Hispanics. Perhaps for Hispanics, the advantages of
being the largest immigrant group in the state|with the large networks and rather Spanish-
friendly environment that entails|mean that having an English-procient child is enough
to function, and thus there is little need for the household to develop further English skills.
The last two columns split the sample by whether respondents report having nished
high school. Those without a high school education are far more likely to lean. In fact, those
with a high school degree appear similar to the adults in the previous section|living with a
school-age child in a compliant area seems to increase the likelihood they will speak English,
though the eect is not statistically signicant. The results are consistent with the cost of
learning a new language decreasing in educational attainment, and thus those with limited
education only learning the language if absolutely necessary (i.e., if there are no children
around to translate).
4.7 Discussion
The evidence in this section suggests that adults are less likely to learn English when they
can rely on the English skills of children, and that this eect may be economically signicant.
The increase in students' English prociency between 1990 and 2000 was greatest in highly
compliant PUMAs. In contrast, English prociency of adults living with children who could
serve as language brokers fell the most in the very areas where students gained the most.
The heterogeneity in the response appears to support the idea of \leaning" being most
prevalent when the need to learn English is most limited or the cost of learning is high,
further supporting the model in Section 2.
325 Conclusion
In this paper I describe how children's acquisition of a given form of human capital can either
encourage or discourage adult household members from acquiring it as well. On the one hand,
children can teach the skill to adults, which, all else equal, will lower adults' marginal cost
of learning the skill. I call this incentive the \learning eect." On the other hand, children's
human capital can substitute for that of adults in household production, which will lower
adults' marginal benet of learning the skill. I call this incentive the \leaning eect."
Obviously, within a household, children's and adult's human capital levels can be corre-
lated for reasons independent of my proposed mechanism. For example, parents can pass on
their human capital to their children, which is after all the more traditional route of trans-
mission; or common genetic or environmental factors might lead everyone in the household
to have similar levels of human capital. As such, I identify two examples in which children
receive sudden shocks to their human capital levels and estimate the eects on the adults in
their household.
Black children in the South had virtually no access to formal education before the Civil
War. Through the eorts of the Freedmen's Bureau and Northern philanthropic societies,
hundreds of thousands of them attended classes in the ve years after the war. Using 1870
Census data from states in the former Confederacy, I nd that when black adults live in
counties with high rates of black child literacy, they are more likely to be literate themselves.
However, the eect is greater for those adults living with a child and greater still for those
living with a school-age child. Thus, former slaves appear to learn from their literate children.
In the summer of 1998, Californians passed Proposition 227, with the aim of replacing
bilingual education with English immersion in public schools. Indeed, during the 1997-1998
school year 29 percent of California students classied as \limited English procient" were
receiving core academic instruction in their native languages; by the fall of 1998 only eleven
percent were. However, the implementation of Proposition 227 varied. I nd that area compli-
ance with Proposition 227 is associated with greater increases in children's English prociency
33between 1990 and 2000. But in the very areas where children's English skills improve the
most, adults living with children (and especially adults living with school-age children) have
lower levels of English prociency compared to a control group of adults who do not have a
child in their household. Thus, adults appear to lean on their English-speaking children.
Though this paper has not focused on why these two groups would have dierent reac-
tions, one can speculate that children's human capital more eectively substitutes for that
of adults in modern immigrant households than it did in the households of former slaves. As
discussed earlier, past work has shown large labor-market returns to literacy for Southern
blacks, and the ability to determine the terms of a contract (which may have been beyond the
scope of even literate children to negotiate) could help protect scarce resources. Moreover,
children's translations could not substitute for some of the goals expressed by former slaves
in historical accounts|being able to read their favorite Bible passage themselves or learning
to read as an expression of full citizenship.
In contrast, sociological and ethnographic accounts of immigrant families frequently de-
scribe adults' expectations that children, who can learn new languages more easily than
adults, serve as translators and negotiators for their families. Given California's large supply
of low-skilled jobs for adults that do not require English uency and long established ethnic
enclaves that provide goods and services in the native language, parents may have lost little
by having their child specialize in English-intensive tasks.
As this paper illustrates, whether adults learn or lean depends on their specic circum-
stances, and future work might explore dierent settings, such as developing countries. As
children in such countries often attain high education levels than their parents, children-to-
adult spillovers might be especially important.
Regardless of the setting, future work might examine the eect on children's well-being
of their parents' decision to either lean or learn. Being forced as a child to language- or
literacy-broker might promote responsibility, maturity and independence, traits that might
improve future labor market outcomes. However, some sociological studies suggest that par-
34ents' inability to speak English may negatively aect their children's education and health.
Weisskirch and Alva (2002) nd that children list report cards and letters from school as the
items they most often translate for their parents, highlighting the diculty English-decient
parents face in monitoring their children's educational progress. A plurality of the 203 His-
panic parents interviewed by Flores et al. (1998) cites \language problems" as the single
greatest barrier to obtaining health care for their children. Any negative eects of leaning
might be especially important in developing countries, where children already face enormous
challenges.
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38Appendix
Proof of proposition stated in Section 2.
Proposition. The eect of children's human capital on that of adults in the household,
@k(e)
@c , can be positive or negative. It is a positive function of ( ec). This term represents
the extent to which learning from procient children can lower the per-unit cost of adults'
human capital investment (the \learning eect"). It is a negative function of yc, the direct
contribution of children's human capital to adults' consumption (the \leaning eect").
Proof. First, note that adult's human capital k = k(e) is a positive function of investment e
alone, so it is sucient to show the above result for optimal investment e.
Recall the rst-order condition which holds for optimal e:  0yk(k(e);c)ke(e) = e(e;c).
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By the assumptions regarding functional forms described in Section 2, the denominator is
always positive. Thus, the sign of e
c is equal to the sign of the numerator.
What is the eect of  ec, the \learning eect?" It only enters the expression in the
second term of the numerator, and as  ec increases the expression increases as well. Thus,
the sign on the \learning eect" is positive.
What is the eect of yc, the \leaning eect?" It only enters in the rst term of the
numerator, and is multiplied by  00, which by the concavity assumption is negative. Thus,
the sign on the \leaning eect" is negative.
39Table 1: Summary statistics, 1870 Census data
Children age 10 - 18 Adults age 25 - 60
Literate 0.192 0.103
(0.394) (0.304)








Child in household 0.822
(0.383)
School-age child in household 0.457
(0.498)
Observations 11,417 17,388
Notes: Data from the 1870 IPUMS, weighted by IPUMS person-level sample weights. All observa-
tions in both columns are black, born in the South and living in the former Confederacy at the
time of the Census. Only counties in which at least 100 observations can be sampled are included.
The Census at the time did not collect literacy information for individuals younger than ten years
old. A child is dened as \school-age" if he is between 10 and 14 years old, as school attendance
peaks at these ages for children in the sample.
40Table 2: The eect of black child literacy rates on black adult literacy
Treatment: Child in household Treatment: School-age child in household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment x Black child 0.187 0.121 0.144 0.114 -0.0141 0.114
literacy rate [0.0591] [0.0526] [0.0564] [0.0482] [0.0687] [0.0499]
Black child literacy rate 0.458 0.562
[0.0860] [0.0878]
Treatment -0.0320 -0.0223 -0.0216 -0.0187 0.0227 -0.0172
[0.0104] [0.00899] [0.00892] [0.00790] [0.0213] [0.0217]
Treatment x White child -0.00204
literacy rate [0.0298]
Male 0.00572 0.00661 0.00271 0.00348 0.0634 0.00337
[0.00442] [0.00435] [0.00491] [0.00483] [0.0106] [0.00485]
Urban 0.0263 0.0917 0.0308 0.0901 0.0798 0.0901
[0.0194] [0.0191] [0.0184] [0.0181] [0.0301] [0.0181]
Sample Black adults Black adults Black adults w Black adults w White adults w Black adults w
child in HH child in HH child in HH child in HH
County xed-eects? No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,388 17,388 14,292 14,292 5,912 14,231
Notes: See Table 1 for sampling and variable denitions. County-level literacy rates are estimated by aggregating IPUMS data to the
county level. All regressions include age-in-years xed eects, are estimated with OLS, cluster standard errors at the county level, and
use IPUMS sample weights. The sample size falls in col. (5) because the IPUMS sampling rule leads to over-sampling of counties with
large black populations. p < 0:1; p < 0:05; p < 0:01.
4
1Table 3: The eect of county-level child literacy rates on black adult literacy, robustness
checks
Dependent Variable: Respondent is...
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Literate Literate Literate In school Literate
School-age child in HH x 0.114 0.121 0.151 -0.00125 0.128
Bl child lit rate [0.0482] [0.0564] [0.0596] [0.00251] [0.0415]
School-age child in -0.0187 -0.0236 -0.0266 0.000956 -0.0224
household [0.00790] [0.00895] [0.00996] [0.000954] [0.00778]
Male 0.00348 0.00807 0.00254 0.000203 0.0161
[0.00483] [0.0100] [0.00550] [0.000460] [0.00480]
Urban 0.0901 0.0604 0.113 0.00130 0.126
[0.0181] [0.0209] [0.0281] [0.00237] [0.0195]
Sample Full Excl. potential Excl. Full Only ages
sample CW veterans NC, LA, VA sample 20 - 40
Observations 14,292 9,410 11,074 14,299 14,865
Notes: See Tables 1 and 2 for variable denitions and sampling rules. Col. (1) merely replicates
col. (4) of Table 2. All regressions include xed eects for county and age in years and sample only
blacks living with at least one child in their household. The non-veteran sample comprise all women
but excludes men between the ages of 24 and 45 as they would have been most likely to have served
in the Union Army. p < 0:1; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
42Table 4: Summary statistics, 1990 and 2000 Census data
Children age 5 - 18 Adults age 25 - 60








After Prop. 227 0.471 0.508
(0.499) (0.500)
Child in household 0.646
(0.478)
Child age 7-15 in household 0.368
(0.482)
Observations 27,767 44,110
Notes: All data taken from the 1990 and 2000 IPUMS, weighted by IPUMS person-level sample
weights. To be included in the sample, respondents must be born in a non-English-speaking country,
be living in California at the time they were observed in the Census, and have arrived in the US
no earlier than three years before the time of the Census. In addition, adults must not be currently
enrolled in school.
43Table 5: The eect of Proposition 227 on children's and adults' English prociency
Treatment group: Treatment group:
Children Adults living w children Adults living w children 7-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Speaks Eng. Prociency Speaks Eng. Speaks Eng. Speaks Eng. Speaks Eng. Prociency Speaks Eng.
PUMA compliance 0.118 0.358 0.122 0.116 0.140 0.196 0.143 0.259
rate x After [0.0512] [0.180] [0.0528] [0.0862] [0.0800] [0.0978] [0.287] [0.0864]
Treatment x Comp. -0.0685 -0.0425 -0.244 -0.428 -0.252
rate x After [0.0890] [0.0814] [0.110] [0.234] [0.111]
Male -0.0164 -0.0634 -0.0166 0.0507 0.0504 0.0700 0.130 0.0694
[0.00573] [0.0150] [0.00563] [0.00393] [0.00389] [0.00462] [0.0170] [0.00458]
Hispanic -0.0990 -0.527 -0.0893 -0.156 -0.114 -0.176 -0.552 -0.138
[0.0123] [0.0451] [0.0171] [0.0171] [0.0212] [0.0197] [0.0576] [0.0239]
Covariates Standard Standard Additional Standard Additional Standard Standard Additional
Control group N/A N/A N/A Other Other Other adults Other adults Other adults
adults adults with kids with kids with kids
Observations 27,760 27,760 27,741 37,138 37,111 24,905 24,905 24,882
Notes: See Table 4 All regressions are estimated via OLS, cluster standard errors at the PUMA level, and use sample weights. \Standard"
covariates include xed eects for PUMA, all lower-order terms of Compliance rate  After in cols. (1) through (3) and Treatment 
Compliance rate  After in cols (4) through (8), region of home country (dened by the eleven categories in the Census), and age in
years. \Additional" covariates include all of the standard covariates, as well as interactions between the Hispanic indicator variable and
After, Compliancerate and Compliance rate  After, as well as interactions between household income and After, Compliancerate
and Compliance rate  After and interactions between age and After, Compliancerate and Compliance rate  After. p < 0:1; p <
0:05; p < 0:01
4
4Table 6: The eect of Proposition 227 on adults' English prociency, robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment x -0.244 -0.283 -0.251 -0.315 -0.0532 -0.690 0.191
Comp. rate x After [0.110] [0.138] [0.0900] [0.122] [0.136] [0.245] [0.197]
Male 0.0700 0.0783 0.0701 0.0817 0.0586 0.0883 0.0421
[0.00462] [0.00590] [0.00465] [0.00835] [0.00715] [0.0107] [0.00528]
Hispanic -0.176 -0.203 -0.177 -0.103 -0.156
[0.0197] [0.0237] [0.0198] [0.0438] [0.0164]
Sample All All All Hispanic Non-Hisp. No HS deg HS deg
Specication OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treatment: Liv-
ing w children age 7-15 7-15 6-16 7-15 7-15 7-15 7-15
Observations 24,905 24,829 24,905 14,198 10,707 11,800 13,105
Notes: See Table 5 for sampling rules and variable denitions. All regressions include the \standard"
set of covariates described in Table 5. Col. (1) merely replicates col. (6) of Table 5. All regressions
include only those adults living with children, as in cols. (6)-(8) of Table 5. In col. (2) the probit
results are reported as marginal eects. p < 0:1; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
45Figure 1: Relationship between adult and child literacy among former slaves in 1870
Souce: IPUMS data, 1870. The universe of respondents used to generate this gure are black
residents born in the South and residing in the former Confederacy at the time of the Census.
I plot county-level literacy rates for black children age 10-18 on the x-axis. The same statistic is
calculated separately for the three groups of adults and plotted on the y-axis.
46Figure 2: Percentage-point change in English-speaking share of California children and
adults, 1990-2000
Source: IPUMS data, 1990 and 2000, and school-level California Department of Education data.
A school's compliance rate is dened as the percent-point decrease in the share of English learners
receiving core academic instruction in their primary language. This measure is weighted by total
English-learner enrollment and averaged for all schools in a PUMA. In order to avoid having the
area where the majority of the data lie from being overly compressed, the scatter plot drops outliers
(those observations with y-axis variables greater than 0.2 or less than -0.2). These outliers represent
0.4 percent of the observations in the children sample and 2.8 percent of the observations in the
adult sample. The tted lines, however, include these outliers.
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